facebook twitter you tube



Train To Nowhere!

It is crystal clear that this project will be a mullti-billion dollar albatross on California

Jun 29, 2011


Families Protecting The Valley Newsletter Tell Your Friends about Families Protecting The Valley
VOLUME 3 ISSUE 18 JUNE 29 2011
» HSR Finances
» 100% Untrue
Donate to Families Protected the Valley
Visit Our Web Site

Visit Our Web Site

Board of Directors

Denis Prosperi
Chester Andrew
Bob Smittcamp
Russ Waymire
John "Dusty" Giacone
Joe Marchini
Mark Watte
Kole Upton
Piedad Ayala
Tom Barcellos
Jim Walls

Train to Nowhere!

When is enough, enough?  How much longer must the taxpayers continue to pay the estimated $1,000,000 dollars per working day to consultants and staff in the effort to inflict High Speed Rail on California residents?  It is crystal clear that this project will be a mullti-billion dollar albatross on California, a state that is already facing monumental deficits. 

Congress has already 'zeroed out' High Speed Rail for 2012.  It is time that Governor Brown and California State legislators do the same.  The time for the promotion of taxpayer funded boondoggles is over. It is time for responsible fiscal leadership.

If you enjoy our newsletter please help us grow by sending it to friends.  If someone sent this to you and you'd like your own free subscription please sign up here

High-speed rail plan proceeds despite warnings

Analysts say project is tens of billions short.

By Lance Williams / California Watch and Ronald Campbell / Orange County Register

The agency spearheading California's efforts to build a high-speed train through the center of the state is plunging forward despite repeated warnings that it may be tens of billions of dollars short of the money needed to build and operate the system, records and interviews show.

"There is an air of unreality" about the project's $45 billion construction budget, a panel of experts warned the state Legislature last year.

It's a "big gamble" to start construction, the nonpartisan Legislative Analyst's Office warned in May, saying financing was "highly uncertain."

The project lacks "a disciplined business plan that makes any sense," says state Treasurer Bill Lockyer. He fears Wall Street won't invest anywhere near the $12 billion in private capital needed to build the system.

Undergirding the warnings, an inquiry by California Watch and the Orange County Register has found, is a tangle of related concerns:

The appointed officials who make up California's High-Speed Rail Authority say they will rely on $19 billion in federal aid to pay for the 800-mile system. But the legislative analyst says federal funding may amount to less than $4 billion – a $15 billion shortfall.

The rail authority's $45 billion construction estimate may be $22 billion too low, the legislative analyst says. Cost overruns of the sort that have afflicted other big U.S. projects could even drive the actual price above $200 billion, according to a critical study by a Stanford University professor.

The high-speed train's prospects for turning big profits are founded on ridership forecasts that are deeply flawed, two studies claim. Rather than making billions in profits, high-speed rail might actually "incur significant revenue shortfalls," a University of California at Berkeley study found.

The high-speed train's boosters say these concerns are unfounded or overblown. They say they are confident that sufficient funds will be found to build the system, which would connect Orange County and San Francisco via 220-mph trains.

Rail is the cheapest way to meet the transportation needs of California's burgeoning population, which could reach 50 million by 2030, advocates say.

Construction of the first leg, linking Fresno and Bakersfield, is set to begin next year. Eventually, trains would run all the way from Sacramento to San Diego.

The authority has based its cost estimates on mountains of studies, Deputy Executive Director Jeff Barker said. When the legislative analyst criticizes the authority's cost estimate, he said, it's "simply dumbing down the process."

He criticized the analyst's office for suggesting an overhaul of the project, saying that would mean delays guaranteed to increase the price.

"The sooner we build it," said rail authority Chairman Tom Umberg, "the less expensive it will be."


Plans start rolling


Japan, France and Spain are among the nations that have turned to high-speed rail to solve 21st-century transportation problems.

For a generation, transportation planners in California have looked to trains as well. In a state where the car is king, some saw rail as a way to break the cycle of building freeways to ease traffic gridlock, only to see the new roads fill up with cars. There were other foreseen benefits: Reining in urban sprawl. Reducing dependence on foreign oil. Cutting smog. And, of course, the economic boost that would come with a massive public works project.

In 2008, state voters approved $9.95 billion in bonds to begin building the system. Trains would be fast, frequent and cheap to ride, voters were told. Once the system was built, it would make money. No taxpayer subsidy would be allowed.

In the depths of a recession, the economic boost the project would provide was another selling point: Advocates said the high-speed train would create 160,000 construction jobs and 450,000 permanent jobs – "American jobs that cannot be outsourced," the ballot argument said.

With the election of President Barack Obama, the project got another boost: $3.48 billion in federal stimulus funds. Almost half of that came when Ohio, Florida and Wisconsin dumped planned rail projects, saying they didn't pencil out.


Funding questioned


With the federal funds came deadlines: California was told it had to begin construction in 2012. As high-speed rail rolled onto the fast track, there came official scrutiny – and then alarm.

In the past two years, the state auditor, UC Berkeley's Institute of Transportation Studies, the legislative analyst and a peer-review group expert panel formed by the Legislature have studied the project's finances.

So have a Stanford-trained expert in statistical economics and a Stanford management professor affiliated with a Palo Alto citizens group called Californians Advocating Responsible Rail Design.

The studies have repeatedly red-flagged the project – starting with its source of funds. In a 2009 business plan, the rail authority said it would draw on as much as $45 billion in funding to build the system – including up to $19 billion in federal money. But three inquiries concluded that the rail authority had been wildly optimistic about receiving billions in federal funds in an era of soaring deficits and deep budget cuts.

The legislative analyst's May report was especially pessimistic, saying the rail plan was larded with "unrealistic assumptions" and suggesting that federal aid would fall $15 billion short.

Prospects for raising $12 billion in private capital for high-speed rail aren't bright either, the reviews have suggested. Echoing concerns that have been expressed by the state treasurer, the peer-review group wrote that Wall Street is aware that continued federal aid is iffy. That concern "limits the project's credibility with private investors," the group wrote.

Critics even have concerns about what seems the most solid financial commitment of all – the state bonds.

As the legislative analyst wrote, if lawmakers authorize selling all $9.95 billion of the bonds, the interest that must be paid to investors will run about $1 billion a year – money that would come out of the state's general fund.


Cost estimates vary


The studies also have criticized the rail authority's construction cost estimates.

Those estimates have marched steadily upward – from $15 billion in 1996 to between $43 billion and $45 billion in 2009 dollars, according to the authority.

That amount dovetails with the approximately $45 billion in funding that the authority says it has identified to build the system.


So what's the actual cost?


In its study, the Legislative Analyst's Office noted that the cost of building the first segment – the 100-mile stretch between Bakersfield and Fresno – was estimated at $2.8 billion in 2009. Today, it's increased by 57% to nearly $4.5 billion.

At that rate of increase, building the entire system would cost $67 billion.

For its analysis, the Palo Alto citizens group scrutinized estimates submitted by the authority in applications for federal stimulus funds. The group said the actual cost to build the system was probably $65 billion.

But if it's like the new Bay Bridge, or Boston's Big Dig highway project, the cost will be far higher, according to Stanford management professor Alain Enthoven. With the cost overruns that typically plague public works projects, the final price tag may be closer to $213 billion, he wrote.

"All megaprojects have cost overruns," Enthoven said. "For a state project, if they figure on $43 billion and then it turns out to be $66 or $80 billion, then it's the taxpayer of the state of California [who pays]. There's no fairy godmother."


Studies slam projections


Critics also take aim at the rail authority's upbeat computer forecasts, which show strong future demand for the service. By the year 2035, the rail authority estimates trains will carry 39 million passengers per year, the forecasts say.

Those big numbers undergird the rail authority's claims that the train will generate "over $1 billion in annual profits" when up and running.

The forecasts are the work of a consulting firm, Cambridge Systematics. It polled California travelers, collected other data and created a complex computer model to predict demand. To ensure accuracy, the computer model was subjected to peer review from outside experts. The firm was paid $2 million for its work, records show.

Two different studies have contended the forecasts are deeply flawed.

The first critique was by Elizabeth Alexis, a Palo Alto money manager and co-founder of Californians Advocating Responsible Rail Design.

Alexis said she also found that the consultants had privately made "drastic" changes to key assumptions in the computer model, apparently after initial results were deemed unsatisfactory. The tinkering allegedly occurred after the model was reviewed by outside experts who were supposed to provide guidance on whether its results were valid.

The forecasts were no better than "tossing darts at a board," Alexis said. "I would like to have real numbers so we can have an intelligent discussion about where California should put its transportation dollars."

Concerns were underscored when UC Berkeley's Institute of Transportation Studies weighed in. That study declared that the rail authority's model was "flawed at key decision-making junctures," as Institute Director Samer Madanat put it. The study was too unreliable to predict whether high-speed rail would pay for itself or lose "significant" money," the institute said.

Chief executive Roelof van Ark defended the model, saying there was "no foundation" for the institute's conclusion that it was useless for predicting the bullet train's bottom line.


Gov’t Communications on “Train to Nowhere” Probed by CEI's FOIA of Department of Transportation

$715 Million Rail Construction Off to Questionable Start in Rural California Central Valley

Washington, DC, June 21, 2011 – Americans deserve to know what government officials really think about the “train to nowhere” supported by the Obama administration and some politicians in California. That’s why the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) has sent a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), seeking communications and records pertaining to congressional liaison and the Central Valley High-Speed Rail Corridor.

The $715 million Obama stimulus money – the federal American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) – granted to the Central Valley corridor was announced on October 25, 2010, just over a week before the November election.

“Californians have been questioning the reasoning of this ARRA grant for months,” said Marc Scribner, a land-use and transportation policy analyst at CEI’s Center for Economic Freedom who submitted the FOIA request on behalf of CEI.

“With the recent highly critical reports of both the state’s Legislative Analyst’s Office and the Independent Peer Review Group on the questionable future of high-speed rail in California, Californians and the rest of America have many questions that merit answers,” said Scribner. “The need for increased transparency is even more apparent after the Department of Transportation rejected attempts by the California High-Speed Rail Authority to secure more flexibility in where to construct and operate the first segment.”

CEI’s interest in the documents springs from its efforts to shed light on this expensive public transport project funded by ARRA.

The FOIA request includes the release of any and all written correspondence or other records sent or received by the OST and/or the FRA; specifically, documents that cite, name, or reference U.S. Representative Dennis Cardoza and U.S. Representative James Costa, their respective offices, staffs, and the 18th and 20th California Congressional Districts, respectively.

Additionally, CEI will be requesting any and all written correspondence or records related to the Central Valley High-Speed Rail Corridor proposed to be built between Borden and Corcoran, California, that specifically reference former Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, California High-Speed Rail Authority President Roelof van Ark, U.S. Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood, and FRA Administrator Joe Szabo.

The ultimate goal of this request is to increase transparency. CEI seeks to disclose all information regarding the appropriation of tax dollars in constructing this “train to nowhere,” ascertain the effect on the taxpayer, and reveal the rationale behind the Department of Transportation’s unbending resolve in pursuing this project.

> Read the FOIA requests on cei.org


Valid RSS FeedGet the 10 most recent items from our RSS feed.